Annex 3 – Team Leader Embarkation Form

| GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE SHIP | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------|------------------------|--|
| | Details | Notes | |
| Name of ship | | | |
| IMO number | | | |
| Call sign | | | |
| Dates of transport | | | |
| Load | | | |
| PMSC embarkation point | | | |
| PMSC disembarkation point | | | |
| Proposed IRTC route | | East-West or West-East | |
| Date/Time of arrival in HRA | | | |
| Date/Time of departure from | | | |
| HRA | | | |
| DTG waypoint BEM | | | |
| DTG waypoint point A | | | |
| DTG waypoint point B | | | |
| Ship condition: | | | |
| Loaded/In ballast | | | |
| At anchor/Moored in port | | | |
| Summer deadweight: | tonnes | | |
| Planned boat speed through | knots | | |
| HRA | | | |
| Lowest freeboard with load: | metres | | |
| (lowest deck) | | | |
| Freeboard at summer draught: | metres | | |
| | | | |

| INFORMATION ABOUT THE TEAM MEMBERS | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------|-------|--|
| Team member | Details | Notes | |
| Name | | | |
| Date of birth | | | |
| Address | | | |
| Nationality | | | |
| Passport number | | | |

| INFORMATION ABOUT THE WEAPONS | | |
|--|---------|-------|
| | Details | Notes |
| Date and time of weapon embarkation | | |
| Place or location | | |
| Floating armoury? Yes/No | | |
| If yes, name of ship | | |
| Floating armoury company | | |
| Date and time of weapon disembarkation | | |

| | | 1 |
|---|-----------|---------------------------|
| Place or location of weapon | | |
| disembarkation | | |
| Floating armoury? Yes/No | | |
| If yes, name of ship | | |
| Floating armoury company | | |
| | | |
| | 2010 | |
| INFORMATION ABOUT THE WEA | | I a |
| Weapons | Details | Notes |
| Brand and type of weapons | | |
| Serial numbers | | |
| Attach photo of weapon serial | | |
| numbers | | |
| | | |
| INFORMATION ABOUT THE AMM | IUNITION | |
| Ammunition | Details | Notes |
| Ammunition type | Details | (Calibre, FMJ/soft-point) |
| Number of bullets | | (camere) may some pome; |
| Transcr or banets | | |
| | <u> </u> | |
| | | |
| TEAM LEADER RISK ANALYSIS | | |
| Nature of the risk | | Notes |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| PREPARATORY MEASURES BY TE | AM LEADER | T |
| Members of security team | | |
| briefed on procedure manual | | |
| and rules of engagement | | |
| Security team members have | | |
| signed a declaration confirming their awareness of the contents | | |
| | | |
| of the procedure manual and | | |
| the rules of engagement | | |
| Weapons and equipment of | | |
| Security team members checked | | |
| Drill completed with security team, covering the use of | | |
| _ | | |
| weapons in particular | | |
| Name of security team member designated as team medic | | |
| designated as team medic | | |
| | | |

| BMP5 checklist for TEAM LEADER | |
|--|--|
| General | |
| Is it the intention to sail through the HRA at maximum speed? | |
| What is the maximum speed of the ship? | |
| What is the cruising speed of the ship? | |
| Will the ship be sailing alone, in convoy or in group transit? | |
| Is it the intention not to carry out work on deck during the passage through the high-risk area? | |
| Crew preparation | |
| Has the crew received a briefing from the TL/PCASP team in which they were made aware of: | |
| The danger of piracy The latest intelligence (threat assessment) What to do in an emergency How access to the accommodation block and | |
| engine rooms will be controlled/regulated during the passage through the HRA. Ref BMP 5 p. 9 and p. 16 | |
| Has the crew been trained in the actions to be taken if there is a risk of attack by pirates? • First actions of bridge team and PCASP on suspicious approach • Alerting the crew • First actions to be taken by the crew • Retreat to citadel when ordered to do so • What to do when the 'all clear' is given Ref BMP 5 p. 9 | |
| Manoeuvring: has the bridge team | |
| practised taking the first evasive | |

| manoeuvres after observing a | | |
|---|------------------|--|
| suspicious vessel? | | |
| Mandatory measures upon entry int | o high-risk area | |
| Binoculars available | | |
| Searchlights available | | |
| Concertina razor wire with a roll | | |
| diameter of at least 730 mm | | |
| available and in place | | |
| Safe muster point or safe room | | |
| designated for ship's crew | | |
| Trained crew members deployed to | | |
| one or more lookout posts | | |
| Water or foam sprayers mounted | | |
| on the deck near potential | | |
| boarding points | | |
| Crew prepared by means of anti- | | |
| piracy exercises | | |
| Doors and hatches giving access to | | |
| the bridge, the crew and passenger | | |
| quarters and the engine rooms | | |
| have been locked | | |
| Large windows and portholes | | |
| reinforced | | |
| Ship equipment and machinery | | |
| protected against third-party use | | |
| | | |
| Other measures | | |
| Place dummies (mannequins) on | | |
| the bridge wings and/or other | | |
| places to give the impression that a | | |
| good lookout is being kept; | | |
| Avoid drifting and slow | | |
| speeds, and do not anchor in the | | |
| HRA; | | |
| Anti-RPG fencing along the | | |
| bridge wings to provide protection | | |
| against Rocket-Propelled Grenades | | |
| (RPGs); | | |
| Sandbags or water-filled | | |
| oil drums beside openings along | | |
| the bridge wings, behind which | | |
| PCASP and bridge crew can take | | |
| shelter; | | |
| Steel plates that can be quickly mounted on a number of | | |
| quickly mounted on a number of | | |
| bridge windows on both port and starboard sides in the event of an | | |
| attack or suspicious approach; | | |
| Anti-blast lamination on | | |
| bridge windows to protect against | | |
| bridge willdows to protect against | | |

| flying glass caused by bullet impacts. | | |
|--|------------|--|
| Other (non-physical) protective measures that may be considered (not mandatory): | | |
| If present, CCTV cameras should be positioned to provide a view of areas that are vulnerable to pirates, such as the quarterdeck and the lowest deck (wind hole); If present, CCTV cameras could be positioned in such a way, potentially with a searchlight alongside, that the surroundings (the water) at the rear of the ship (behind the railing) can be monitored from the bridge; Searchlights that can be switched on instantly at night to detect, observe and blind pirates;¹ The ability to centrally switch off lighting in the accommodation block to disorient pirates once inside; Displaying warning signs on the outside of the ship in English and/or Somali and/or drawings indicating that the ship is protected by armed guards. | | |
| Ref BMP-5 p. 18 Communication and means of comm | nunication | |
| Do all means of communication | | |
| work? | | |
| VHF from the bridge VHF from the citadel INMARSAT from the bridge and/or cabin INMARSAT from the citadel Internal ship | | |
| communication devices | | |

¹ During darkness, the ship should only use navigation lights

| (telephones/two-way | |
|---|--|
| radios); | |
| Has the SSAS² been tested? | |
| Is the AIS enabled or disabled?³ | |
| Are the emergency contact | |
| lists up to date and have | |
| they been posted at all | |
| locations from which | |
| external calls can be made, | |
| including the citadel? | |
| Ref: BMP p. 9 | |
| In terms of communication, will the | |
| following actions be taken upon | |
| entry to the HRA? | |
| Minimise use of VHF;⁴ | |
| If VHF is used, only respond | |
| to 'legitimate' or known | |
| contacts. ⁵ | |
| Ref: BMP5 – p. 10 | |
| Have UKMTO and MSCHOA been | |
| informed of the ship's sailing plans | |
| through the Voluntary Reporting | |
| Scheme? Have the following | |
| reports been made, or will they be | |
| made? | |
| Initial report (upon | |
| entering VRA); | |
| Daily (noon) report; | |
| Final report upon leaving | |
| VRA; • Reporting of irregular or | |
| suspicious ship | |
| movements. | |
| Ref: <i>BMP5 p. 21</i> | |
| Ship's resources | |
| Optical resources: | |
| • There are enough | |
| binoculars for all the lookouts and | |
| the bridge team; | |
| Are Night Viewing Optics | |
| and/or Thermal Imagers (TIs) | |
| present and working and can the | |

² SSAS: Ship Security Alert System

³ AIS: Automatic Identification System. It is recommended that this be enabled so that the ship can be tracked by onshore and military authorities, but that it not provide information on course and speed, identity and navigational status (stationary, unmanoeuvrable, moving forward, etc.).

⁴ It could give away the ship's position. Preferably use email and INMARSAT instead.

⁵ There have been cases where people have used VHF to pretend to be someone other than who they really are. VHF communication on the high seas is almost always related to safe navigation or coordination with other shipping.

| crew access them during the hours of darkness? | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Radar. Does the ship have: | | |
| Properly functioning | | |
| navigation radar for all- | | |
| round observation? | | |
| Fence radar (stern radar) | | |
| covering the area behind | | |
| the funnel? | | |
| Alarm signals: Is the alarm that | | |
| sounds in case of a suspicious ship | | |
| or an attack such that the ship | | |
| immediately knows that it is a | | |
| possible attack and the alarm is not | | |
| confused with (for example) a fire | | |
| alarm? | | |
| Ref BMP-5 p. 9 | | |
| Securing the crew – muster, citadel | | |
| Citadel. Is a citadel present or | | |
| designated? | | |
| Does the citadel meet the following | | |
| conditions? | | |
| VHF and/or INMARSAT | | |
| connection with the | | |
| outside world ⁶ (see also | | |
| Section 5); | | |
| Sufficient water and food | | |
| for the entire crew for a | | |
| long period of time; | | |
| Sanitary facilities; | | |
| Team medic designated? | | |
| Sufficient medical | | |
| resources to treat even | | |
| serious injuries; | | |
| Ability to steer the ship; | | |
| Have the crew practised | | |
| evacuating to the citadel? | | |
| Ref BMP-5 p. 17 | | |
| Other observations | 1 | |
| | | |
| I have completed this form correctly | to the best of my knowledge. | |
| Signature | | |
| Team leader's name | | |
| Company | | |

⁶ This is important, because if military authorities cannot be assured that the entire crew is safely in the citadel, military units will not intervene.